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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Long-term relational contracts are widely recognized as posing 
special problems for contract law.1 Such contracts are frequently in-
complete in some sense.2 Of course, short-term contracts may also be 
incomplete, and courts and legislatures have developed various tools 
for filling gaps and resolving ambiguities in such contracts, but those 
tools may not be well suited to long-term contracts. 
 If a long-term contract is incomplete and the relationship is ex-
pected to continue, the missing terms or ambiguous obligations must 
be renegotiated when the situation requires it. Although such rene-
gotiation always presents the possibility that one or both of the par-
ties will attempt to behave opportunistically, whether or not the rela-
tionship is vertical, the power to “hold up” the other party is particu-
larly strong in a vertical relationship in which a party has made a 
specialized investment.3 
                                                                                                                      
 * Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. My thanks to my col-
league Jim Rossi for organizing this Symposium, to Dean Donald J. Weidner for his com-
ments on an earlier draft of this Article, and to Professors Baker and Krawiec for their 
thoughtful and innovative work. 
 1. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 
VA. L. REV. 1089 passim (1981); Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Condi-
tions of Radical Judicial Error, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 749, 751 (2000). 
 2. As Baker and Krawiec point out, all contracts must be “obligationally” complete to 
be enforceable. Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Incomplete Contracts in a Complete 
Contract World, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 725, 726 (2006). 
 3. All contracts present some opportunity for opportunistic behavior, even if they are 
short-term and fully specified. A party may behave opportunistically so long as enforce-
ment costs and the costs of delay are sufficiently high and/or reputational costs are suffi-
ciently low. The holdup power involved in specialized investment is (or may be) different in 
magnitude and, therefore, in the incentive to behave badly.  
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 In their article for this Symposium, Incomplete Contracts in a 
Complete Contract World,4 Professors Scott Baker and Kimberly D. 
Krawiec argue that this holdup power creates incentives for economi-
cally inefficient contracting by encouraging both under- and overin-
vestment.5 They maintain that this problem is best eliminated by 
vertical integration—that is, by sole ownership rather than contract.6 
However, sole ownership is not always possible; when it is not, they 
say, the parties must perforce rely on contract.7 Accordingly, they ar-
gue, contract law should seek to approximate the incentives, invest-
ments, and production levels that would be reached in an integrated 
firm.8 
                                                                                                                      
 4. Baker & Krawiec, supra note 2. 
 5. See id. at 731-33. They note, however, that the overinvestment incentive is cre-
ated by the measure of damages in contract actions when parties have not specified the 
level of their joint investment and is not therefore limited to the problem of vertical rela-
tionships. See id. at 735-38. 
 6. See id. at 731-33. According to Baker and Krawiec, sole ownership eliminates the 
incentives for under- or overinvestment created by contracts. At some point they suggest 
that sole ownership does this by “allocating” bargaining power to the owner. Id. at 733.  
 I hope it is possible to appreciate their point while quibbling with their terminology, 
because I am about to quibble. Human participants in firms may bargain with each other 
over the terms of their participation, but owners do not bargain with their physical assets. 
Ownership is a substitute for bargaining, not a method for allocating power within a bar-
gaining process.  
 Baker and Krawiec, like many economists and law professors, look at firms as a “nexus 
of contracts.” See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Derivatives, Corporate Hedging, and Shareholder 
Wealth: Modigliani-Miller Forty Years Later, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1039, 1062. While this 
terminology is useful, it can also be misleading. The primary utility of firms is that they 
are a substitute for contracts. In that sense, they are a nexus of not-contracts, at least 
when the word “contract” is given its usual legal meaning. 
 7. Baker & Krawiec, supra note 2, at 731, 733. In fact, however, these are not the 
only alternatives. In addition to long-term contracts and vertical integration, parties may 
also use (1) short-term contracts bonded by reputation, (2) joint ownership of the process 
and output, as in a partnership or joint venture, (3) partial ownership of one by the other, 
and (4) cross ownership. More than one method can be used simultaneously, as when a 
firm pays a consultant in stock or stock options pursuant to a formal long-term contract. 
No one method dominates. RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, The LAW AND 
FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 283-84 (2d ed. 1995); see also Ronald J. Gilson & 
Mark J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate Govern-
ance and Industrial Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 871, 905 (1993) (arguing that “cross-
ownership reduces the risk of opportunism”).  
 We do not know very much about why firms use the methods they do, but apparently 
the different methods have different cost-benefit tradeoffs that make them appropriate (or 
not) in different circumstances. All of the methods must have survival value, or they would 
long since have been removed from the menu of options. Their survival value may well de-
pend on the fact that they are not like each other. Thus, any move toward making one 
method more like another—such as making a long-term contract more like sole owner-
ship—would be a move in precisely the wrong direction. It is not clear whether that is what 
Baker and Krawiec are attempting to do. 
 8. See Baker & Krawiec, supra note 2, at 735 n.27. Baker and Krawiec recognize 
that many vertical contracts do not involve a specialized investment by either party and 
therefore do not create more than the usual opportunities for a holdup in the renegotiation 
process. See id. at 731. 
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 To accomplish this, Baker and Krawiec propose a new default rule 
for contracts in which one party has made a specialized investment. 
This new rule, the “relationship-specific investment” (RSI) default, 
would apply when (1) a party gives notice that it is making or has 
made a specialized investment which relates to the contract and (2) 
the other party consents or at least does not object.9  
 Briefly, the RSI default is a rule of construction.  It directs  courts, 
when deciding between two conflicting but credible interpretations of 
(1) ambiguous language, (2) the content of a missing term, or (3) the 
meaning of the background obligation of good faith, to adopt the in-
terpretation proffered by the relationship-specific investor.10 The de-
fault applies to every term of the contract, whether or not that term 
is significantly related to the investment.11 Parties bargaining in the 
shadow of the default, either before formation or thereafter, will 
know in advance who is likely to win if the contract is unclear or ne-
gotiations break down.  That knowledge will affect their bargaining 
behavior.12  
 In this Article, I evaluate Baker and Krawiec’s proposal by first 
asking whether, given their definition of a relationship-specific in-
vestment, either the parties or the courts will know whether it ap-
plies in any given case. I conclude that they will not. Second, I evalu-
ate whether the RSI default, if intelligibly defined and adopted, 
would reduce holdups without creating more costs than benefits. I 
conclude that it is unlikely. 
                                                                                                                      
 9. Id. passim. Apparently, the notice need not be formal, or even actual, and may be 
given after the investment is made. A post-investment notice would not operate retroac-
tively, but the default would apply to any new terms.  
 10. See id. passim. I am agnostic on the propriety of calling a rule of construction a 
“default rule.” I tend to think that it is not, but contracts scholars are entitled to their own 
vocabulary, even if it is unintelligible to those of us who reserve the “default” modifier for 
rules that commence with an “unless otherwise agreed” clause.  
 11. See id. at 728. This apparently means that a party who has made a relatively 
small specialized investment would prevail in a dispute involving potential damages that 
dwarf that investment’s size.  
 12. See id. at 728, 734. For this or any contractual default rule to succeed in modify-
ing behavior, the parties must be rational actors. It is unclear to me why the parties are 
presumed to be smart enough to reason back from the impact of a default rule but too 
dumb to protect themselves in the contract itself. See generally Eric A. Posner, Economic 
Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829 
(2003).  In this connection, I note that although Baker and Krawiec say they assume ra-
tional actors, their hypothetical examples of the RSI in action all seem to involve parties 
who are so cognitively impaired that they are either insane or about to sprout leaves. 
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II.   DEFINING THE PROBLEM 
A.   What Do (Most) Economists Mean by a Relationship-Specific     
Investment? 
 The particular problem with long-term vertical contracts that 
Baker and Krawiec are attempting to solve (or at least ameliorate) is 
the incentive for opportunistic behavior13 created by specialized in-
vestment.14  
 To see why specialized investment is a problem, and with apolo-
gies to those readers who are already familiar with the literature, the 
time has now come for some economics jargon: specialized invest-
ments create appropriable quasi-rents that provide an incentive for 
opportunistic behavior.15 In their classic article, Benjamin Klein, 
Robert Crawford, and Armen Alchian define the appropriable “quasi-
rent value” of an asset as the difference between its value in its cur-
rent, contracted-for location and use and the higher of its salvage 
                                                                                                                      
 13. See Baker & Krawiec, supra note 2, at 738. In the transactions costs literature, 
opportunistic behavior is generally defined as the unilateral attempt by one party to 
change the terms of a bargain after it has been struck. See, e.g., Jonathan Klick et al., In-
complete Contracts and Opportunism in Franchising Arrangements: The Role of Termina-
tion Clauses (Jan. 9, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author); see also 
Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co., Inc. v. River Valley Cookies, Ltd., 970 F.2d 
273, 281 (7th Cir. 1992) (characterizing opportunistic behavior as “behavior designed to 
change the bargain struck by the parties in favor of the opportunist”). As noted earlier, 
every contract, after formation but before complete performance, presents some possibility 
of opportunistic behavior, if only because enforcement costs are more than zero. See supra 
note 3. 
 Baker and Krawiec appear to be using the term much more loosely. “Opportunism” in 
their lexicon is sometimes just a synonym for bad behavior, and bad behavior in turn is 
any departure from joint profit maximizing—including, perhaps, the rational pursuit of 
self-interest by engaging in distributive bargaining. This is particularly puzzling given 
their explicit reliance on the agency costs literature, which focuses on ex post opportunism. 
They correctly observe that opportunism costs and agency costs may usefully be viewed as 
two different terms for the same phenomenon, divided only by a firm’s boundary. Both in 
turn are subsets of the general problem of moral hazard. Agency costs, however, do not 
arise before the firm is formed. 
 The difference between Baker and Krawiec’s definition of opportunism and the more tra-
ditional use of that term is not merely semantic. If courts are to be directed to distinguish be-
tween contracts that present the possibility of opportunistic behavior and those that do not, 
they must have a definition of opportunism that explicitly links it to specialized investment. 
The risk of ex post opportunism can furnish that link, although it remains to be seen whether 
a default rule is best suited to deal with that risk. More generalized notions of “nonjoint profit 
maximizing behavior” have no obvious link to specialized investment. 
 14. In a somewhat different context, Baker and Krawiec have noted that the choice of 
a default rule for incomplete contracts should depend on the source of the incompleteness. 
See Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Penalty Default Canon, 72 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 663, 666-67 (2004). 
 15. This is not, of course, the only incentive. For example, market concentration is an-
other potential source of holdup power. If the price mechanism is subject to rigging, then 
purchasers of a product subject to the rigged price may prefer building the product to buy-
ing it. This sort of holdup, however, is not subject to the RSI default.  
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value (if it must be moved) or its value to an alternative user (if it 
can remain in place).16  
 For quasi-rents to be worth appropriating, the size of the disparity 
between the contract price and the alternative use must be substan-
tial. If an asset has multiple possible buyers or users at about the 
same price, either the owner of the asset will find a new contract 
partner or the prospective buyer or user of the asset will find some-
one else to take over the obligation. Further, even if market condi-
tions have changed so that alternative contracting partners cannot 
be found at the same price, no unusual holdup power is present if the 
asset’s owner can cheaply transact at a lower price and then sue the 
other party for damages.  
 What gives contracts involving a specialized investment their par-
ticular bite is the absence of readily available market alternatives.17 
Thick markets require at least semistandardized products, and stan-
dardization is the opposite of specialization.18 Thus, appropriable 
quasi-rents are created not by the costs of an investment but by a 
combination of the costs of disinvesting, the costs of monitoring, and 
the costs of enforcement.  
 In this focus on the quasi-rent created by specialized investment, 
however, it is easy to overlook the fact that the absence of a market 
alternative creates mutual holdup power precisely because neither 
party to the contract can easily substitute an unrelated party’s per-
formance. If no one else is buying a customized good, then no one else 
is selling it either.  
 To demonstrate this mutual holdup power, Klein, Crawford, and 
Alchian hypothesize a printing press manufactured and owned by A 
and rented by B, a publisher.19 A will do the actual printing for B, 
                                                                                                                      
 16. Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competi-
tive Contracting Process, 21 J. L. & ECON. 297, 298 (1978).  
 17. It is quite important to differentiate between a specialized investment and an or-
dinary reliance expenditure. Many parties make reliance expenditures, but if those expen-
ditures can be easily recouped in a market transaction, there is no particular holdup power 
associated with them.  
 18. Mobility may also be a factor.  Even a noncustomized asset, once fixed in a specific 
location, may cost a great deal to dismantle and move. Klein et al., supra note 16, at 324. 
The amount of appropriable quasi-rent in such a case will depend on moving costs.  
 19. Id. at 298-99. Their printing press example may be technologically out of date, but it 
serves to illustrate the problem. Klein et al. (and Baker and Krawiec) also use the real-world 
acquisition of Fisher Body by General Motors, a merger whose purported reasons have as-
sumed the status of near-myth. Id. at 308-10. However, as Baker and Krawiec note, several 
comparatively recent studies of the Fisher-GM merger have cast doubt on that myth. Baker 
& Krawiec, supra note 2, at 732 n.19.  I suspect its major utility is therefore to serve as an 
example of the difficulty in recognizing a holdup when it is argued one exists. 
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and A will also pay the operating expenses.20 Once the press has been 
customized for B, it cannot easily be used by someone else.21  
 B, the publisher, knows this, and therefore has an incentive to 
“renegotiate” the contract terms, seeking a lower rent once the press 
has been customized and installed.22 If there is another publisher, C, 
willing to rent the press, but only at some lower amount, then B may 
attempt to reduce the agreed-upon rate to that amount, knowing that 
A has no choice but to give in if A finds litigation too costly an alter-
native.23  
 However, A is not the only one facing a potential holdup. B, the 
publisher, needs that press and needs A to operate it. If B is trying to 
publish on a regular schedule, then A can try to increase the rent, ei-
ther in absolute terms or by reducing the quality of A’s services, 
knowing that B’s business cannot quickly be transferred to another 
press owner. A’s ability to extort B is capped only by the dollar 
amount of losses to which B would be exposed by a delay. Further, it 
may be quite difficult for B to detect an expropriation which takes 
the form of reduced services; at the very least, B would have to en-
gage in costly monitoring and then, if necessary, costly litigation. All 
things considered, it might be better for B to own and operate its own 
press or for A to own and operate its own publisher.24  
 Thus, the relationship between A and B is one of mutual depend-
ence. Either party may attempt to appropriate the quasi-rent created 
by specialized investment and specialized need;25 it is not a one-way 
street.26 
                                                                                                                      
 20. Klein et al., supra note 16, at 299. 
 21. Id. at 298-99. 
 22. See id. 
 23. See id. 
 24. Then again, it might not. Printing press companies do not generally rush out to 
buy publishers; the economies of scope apparently do not outweigh the costs of the quite 
different management competencies involved. Whether, in fact, publishers own and oper-
ate their own presses apparently depends on the kind of publishing; newspapers, with high 
costs of delay, usually do own their presses, while book publishers, whose schedules are 
more flexible, frequently do not. Klein et al., supra note 16, at 301 n.6.  
 25. That mutual dependence also sets some constraints on the amount of the other-
wise possible appropriation. Self-interest, even if untrammeled by concerns for reputation, 
might induce a party to pluck the golden goose, but only a fool would kill it.  
 26. The RSI default ignores this essential mutuality. If both parties are making RSIs, 
Baker and Krawiec claim the default would not apply; they are currently working through 
what should happen in that circumstance. See Baker & Krawiec, supra note 2, at 736 n.29. 
They acknowledge that if both parties are investing, then favoring one party over the other 
would exacerbate the holdup problem. See id. at 731. If, however, appropriable quasi-rents 
always create mutual incentives to engage in opportunistic behavior, then favoring one 
party over the other because one is making a specialized investment while the other has a 
specialized need would also seem to exacerbate the problem. I will come back to this later. 
2006]                     RESPONSE TO BAKER AND KRAWIEC 763 
 
B.   What Do Baker and Krawiec Mean by a “Relationship-Specific 
Investment”? 
 As noted earlier, Baker and Krawiec propose a new RSI default 
rule for contracts in which one party has made a specialized invest-
ment.27 In order to gain the benefits of the default, one party must 
give notice that it is making or has made a specialized investment 
which relates to the contract, and the other party must consent or at 
least not object.28  
 If the default applies, then in any litigation between the parties—
including any dispute as to the interpretation of ambiguous lan-
guage, the contents of an allegedly missing term, or the meaning of 
the background obligation of good faith—the court should favor the 
version proffered by the relationship-specific investor so long as it is 
not absurd.29 
 If the concept of a relationship-specific investment is going to do 
that much heavy lifting, it is essential to define it in a way that is in-
telligible to parties and courts. Without such a definition, the pro-
posed default rule is unworkable and indeed could be pernicious.  
 The difficulty here is distinguishing a relationship-specific in-
vestment from an ordinary, “plain vanilla” investment. Every com-
mercial contract is in some sense an investment, since it involves the 
commitment of resources to a transaction or project with the expecta-
tion of a positive return on those resources.30 Further, because every 
commitment of resources to one contract precludes their commitment 
to alternative contracts,31 every commitment is in that sense contract 
specific.  
 If the contract involves a long-term relationship, then every re-
source commitment is relationship specific, because the resources 
were committed to that relationship rather than others. If the RSI 
default is not intended to apply to every term of every contract under 
the sun,32 then there must be some way of distinguishing a relation-
ship-specific investment from these other investments. 
                                                                                                                      
 27. Id. at 728. 
 28. Id. at 728, 736. 
 29. Id. passim. The default applies to every term of the contract, whether or not that 
term is significantly related to the investment. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 30. It does not matter, for my purposes, whether parties correctly estimate the prob-
ability of gain and the associated risk. It merely matters that they expect to gain from 
trading.  
 31. This is the familiar notion of opportunity cost. MARK SEIDENFELD, MICROECONOMIC 
PREDICATES TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 21 (1996).  
 32. Or indeed every noncontract in which a party has invested something in the proc-
ess of an unsuccessful attempt to form a contract. If that party gives notice of an invest-
ment—which may be quite informal—and the other party does not object, then the RSI de-
fault will supply the “missing terms,” even if those missing terms may be those essential to 
formation.  Baker & Krawiec, supra note 2, at 743 n.60.  
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 Baker and Krawiec recognize the difficulty and have given both a 
general definition of an RSI and some examples of their rule in appli-
cation.33 I applaud their attempt to give concrete guidance, but I do 
not think they are successful in demarcating the line. The problem is 
that although the general definition seems correct,34 their examples 
either do not fall within it or involve contracts that do not and will 
not exist.  
 I turn now to their examples of an RSI to see whether the rela-
tionship-specific investments they describe create appropriable 
quasi-rents. If they do not, then there is no holdup power that needs 
balancing, and the application of their default rule is at best unnec-
essary and at worst creates its own holdup potential. 
III.   THE RSI IN ACTION 
A.   Krantz v. BT Visual Images, L.L.C. 35 
 Steven Krantz was (and presumably still is) a small businessman 
in Northern California.36 He sold videoconferencing systems, which 
he assembled from various components.37 He obtained some—but by 
no means all—of those components from BT38 pursuant to a formal 
“reseller agreement.”39 The reseller agreement permitted Krantz to 
buy components from BT at a wholesale price and to resell them to 
his customers at a specified higher price.40 The agreement explicitly 
                                                                                                                      
 33. Id.  passim. 
 34. Baker and Krawiec never actually explicitly define a “relationship-specific in-
vestment” and therefore do not overtly connect it to specialization or customization. How-
ever, that connection is implicit in their statements that the RSI either loses significant 
value or has no value if the parties do not continue to trade. See id. at 731, 735-36.  It is 
also implicit in their recognition that a contract for the sale of a fungible commodity does 
not implicate the RSI. See id. at 751. 
 35. Krantz v. BT Visual Images, L.L.C., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 209, 211 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2001). 
 36. Id. at 211. 
 37. Id. at 211-12. 
 38. Id. at 212. The BT group marketed British Telecom systems and equipment in 
North America and offered maintenance contracts on those systems. Brief for Respondent 
at 3-5, Krantz, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 209 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (No. A087341) (filed Oct. 19, 
1999). Although Krantz was the appellant for purposes of the summary judgment, he was 
the respondent in a consolidated appeal of a related matter; the trial court denied BT’s re-
quest for attorneys’ fees pursuant to California statute. Thus, Krantz’s opening brief is de-
nominated a “respondent’s” brief, although a later “respondent’s” brief on the summary 
judgment issues was filed by BT. The date of the filing is therefore included to distinguish  
between them. 
 39. Krantz, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 211-12. He had apparently been buying components 
from BT since 1993 but did not have a formal agreement prior to October 1994. See id. at 
211. 
 40. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 38, at 18-19. The parties sometimes called 
the difference the “product margin” and sometimes called it a “commission.” See id. at 19. 
A securities lawyer would think of it as a “spread.”  
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stated that Krantz would be an independent contractor and not BT’s 
agent for the purpose of resales.41  
 One of Krantz’s videoconferencing customers was Kaiser Perma-
nente, a nationwide health care provider in Oakland.42 Krantz’s rela-
tionship with Kaiser allowed him to acquire “know-how” in customiz-
ing systems for it.43  
 At some point in 1994, Kaiser decided to request proposals to sup-
ply twenty-four videoconferencing systems in Kansas City and Den-
ver.44 According to Krantz, these systems were intended to be a “pilot 
project” which, if successful, would then be installed nationwide.45 
Krantz approached BT about teaming up to submit a bid on those 
initial systems and, again according to Krantz, to continue to team 
up on all subsequent Kaiser business if the pilot project succeeded 
and Kaiser thereafter installed systems in all its other offices.46  
 Krantz alleged that the parties agreed to this ongoing teaming ar-
rangement47 but did not agree on either the duration of the “team” 
past the initial bid or the amount of the “product margin”48 Krantz 
would get on any future, post-pilot project business.49 That was all to 
be left to future negotiation.50 Nevertheless, according to Krantz, this 
agreement created both an enforceable contract and a joint venture.51 
                                                                                                                      
 41. See Krantz, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 218. Whether a particular distribution agreement 
creates an agency or is a “mere” contract for resale is a recurring problem in agency law. In 
this case, neither Krantz nor BT apparently sought to characterize the reseller agreement 
as an agency relationship. I use the word “apparently” advisedly, however. Krantz did 
claim that his relationship with BT eventually became a joint venture, id. at 218-19, which 
(like all partnerships) creates mutual agency within the scope of the venture, but when or 
how the alleged joint venture was formed is not clear from the opinion or the briefs.  
 42. See Krantz, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 212. 
 43. Some of that know-how was apparently obtained from a subcontractor. Id. As we 
shall see, there is frequently a problem with assigning property rights in human capital. If 
Krantz has some claim to the exclusive use of the Kaiser know-how, the subcontractor 
would seem to have an equally strong claim.  
 44. See id. at 212. 
 45. Brief for Respondent, supra note 38, at 3-4. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Krantz, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 212. This agreement, if it existed at all, was not me-
morialized in any kind of writing. Id.   
 48. The product margin is sometimes referred to in the opinion as the “profit margin.” 
Krantz, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 212. The difference between a “product margin,” as in a spread 
or allowable commission, and a “profit” is quite important on the question whether the ar-
rangement constituted a partnership, and the court’s conflation of the two is confusing.
BT’s petition for rehearing asked for clarification on this, but the court declined the re-
quest. Petition for Rehearing at 13-16, Krantz, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 209 (No. A087341).  
 49. Krantz, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 218. The missing margin term is sometimes referred 
to as a missing “price” term. In this context, a missing price term and a missing margin 
term are really the same thing. The margin, at least if expressed in absolute dollars rather 
than percentages, would depend on the wholesale versus resale price of the components. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See id. at 217-20. BT denied the existence of any such agreement, but of course, 
for purposes of summary judgment, whether it existed was a disputed question of fact. BT 
therefore relied instead on various legal arguments that it was unenforceable, one of which 
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 Krantz then shared his know-how and his designs for a custom, 
modular, Kaiser-friendly videoconferencing system with BT.52 Once 
BT had obtained this valuable information, it was in a position to cut 
Krantz out. It did not do so, or at least not right away, but it did pre-
sent him with a written teaming agreement for the Kaiser pilot pro-
ject bid which, he alleged, differed substantially from the previous 
oral agreement.53 The most important difference was that the written 
agreement omitted any mention of his participation in any future, 
post-pilot project Kaiser business.54  
 The written agreement was presented on the eve of Kaiser’s dead-
line for proposals, and BT told Krantz that if he did not sign, it would 
go it alone.55 At that point, he consulted an attorney and decided to 
sign it rather than be cut out altogether.56 In the ensuing litigation, 
he claimed duress.57 
 The BT-Krantz bid was successful, and so, apparently, was the pi-
lot project.58 BT continued to do business with Kaiser, but without 
Krantz.59 He sued, claiming, among other things, breach of contract 
and breach of fiduciary duty.60 After protracted and acrimonious pre-
trial skirmishes, BT moved for summary judgment.61 BT argued, 
among other things, that the alleged interim, oral agreement, which 
                                                                                                                      
was that it was merely an “agreement to agree” and therefore too indefinite to be enforced. 
Id. at 218. 
 52. Id. at 212. There was apparently no confidentiality agreement, written or oral. See 
id. at 211-13. Interestingly, Krantz did not claim a property interest in his custom designs 
(or if he did, it is not intelligible from the briefs). He did, however, claim ownership of some 
of the other information he gave BT. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 38, at 7-8. Be-
cause the custom configuration also relied on components from other suppliers, the bid re-
quired knowing the cost of those other components. See id. at 7. Krantz had that informa-
tion; BT apparently did not. See id. Krantz shared that information with BT and later 
claimed that it was his own “proprietary” information. Id.  
 53. Id. The written teaming agreement contained an integration clause. Petition for 
Rehearing, supra note 48, at 8. BT relied heavily on this in its motion for summary judg-
ment, essentially arguing that even if the previous oral agreement did exist, it had been 
superseded by the written agreement. Id.  
 54. It did not, however, omit any terms as to his payment for the pilot project itself. 
The court’s opinion suggests that BT was arguing that the written teaming agreement was 
too indefinite to be enforced. Krantz, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 211, 217-18. In fact, however, BT 
had already paid Krantz for his participation in the pilot project pursuant to the written 
terms; one of its defenses to the allegation that it had breached the written teaming 
agreement was that it had been fully performed. Id. at 218.  
 55. Brief for Respondent, supra note 38, at 7-8. 
 56. Id. at 8. 
 57. Krantz, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 218. 
 58. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 38, at 8-9. 
 59. See id. at 9-10. 
 60. The complaint contained thirteen causes of action. Id. at 10-11. The breach of con-
tract claims apparently covered the reseller agreement, the interim oral agreement, and 
the final teaming agreement. Krantz, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 217-19. The breach of fiduciary 
duty claim was based on the “joint venture” allegedly created either by the interim agree-
ment or the written “teaming” agreement or both. Id. at 219.  
 61. Id. at 213. 
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Krantz conceded omitted future product margins and price terms, 
was too indefinite to be enforced.62  
 The trial court agreed with BT and granted summary judgment 
on all of Krantz’s claims.63 Krantz appealed, and the appellate court 
reversed, ruling that dismissal was premature.64  
 The portion of the opinion of most interest to Baker and Krawiec 
deals with BT’s argument that the oral “contract” was merely an 
“agreement to agree” and therefore unenforceable.65 The appellate 
court held that the missing terms did not render the agreement un-
enforceable as a matter of law.66 It did so in one short paragraph, 
saying that the missing terms were “necessarily” indefinite because 
it remained to be seen whether the joint proposal would be accepted, 
and those terms were not essential elements of an agreement to 
jointly prepare and submit a bid on Kaiser’s proposals, “dependent as 
they were on the scope of Kaiser’s purchases, if any.”67 
 The agreement, assuming that it existed, was certainly highly 
contingent; it depended on winning the bid for the pilot project, on 
Kaiser’s evaluation of the pilot project’s success, and finally on Kai-
ser’s decision to use the Krantz-BT team for any future expansion of 
the pilot project.68 However, Baker and Krawiec are surely correct 
when they say that it is not clear that the necessary information on 
future product and pricing margins was unavailable to the parties.69 
Because the information was available but not included, the stan-
                                                                                                                      
 62. Id. at 217-18. As noted earlier, BT also denied that such an agreement existed, 
but, of course, BT could not have obtained summary judgment based on that denial. See 
supra note 51.  
 63. Krantz, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 213. 
 64. Id. at 217-20.  
 65. Id. at 218. This part of the opinion is also discussed in Robert E. Scott, A Theory of 
Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1656-57 (2003).  
 66. Krantz, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 217-18. 
 67. Id. at 218. The court’s discussion is puzzling because it focuses on the written 
teaming agreement, which was the contract for the joint submission of a bid on the “pilot 
project.” Id. at 212-13, 217-18. BT never argued that agreement was too indefinite to be en-
forced; indeed, it argued that it had been fully performed. See id. at 218. The only “con-
tract” urged to be indefinite was the alleged oral agreement to team on any post-pilot pro-
ject business with Kaiser. Id. at 212-13, 217-18. That was the agreement that Krantz con-
ceded said nothing about margins or prices. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 38, at 6. 
Indeed, it is hard to imagine how the pilot project bid could have been submitted without 
the parties having “costed” it, which means that they had to have addressed margins and 
prices by the time the bid was submitted. Krantz apparently contended that the eventual 
(written) pilot project agreement—allegedly signed under duress—differed from the previ-
ous (oral) agreement as to the margins and prices for that project, not that those terms 
were missing from that oral agreement—at least as to the pilot project bid.  
 68. See Krantz, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 212-13. 
 69. Baker & Krawiec, supra note 2, at 741. Indeed, the parties could have negotiated a 
percentage (as they in fact did for the written agreement) without knowing a dollar amount. 
Krantz’s expert witness used just such a percentage in calculating his claimed damages for 
his exclusion from that additional business.  
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dard analysis of agreements to agree would have led the court to re-
fuse to enforce the agreement. 
 Baker and Krawiec nevertheless maintain that the case was cor-
rectly decided because their RSI default would have reached the 
same result.70 Krantz, they say, made a relationship-specific invest-
ment by sharing his expertise about Kaiser’s needs with BT; his in-
vestment was specific to the missing margin and price terms because 
he would not have shared his expertise if he had thought BT would 
use it for its own advantage, with no compensation to him.71 They 
also say he gave the requisite notice by telling BT that he had devel-
oped this expertise through his relationship with Kaiser.72 Further, 
they say, BT was fully aware that Krantz expected his expertise-
sharing to pay off in the form of a continued relationship.73 Thus, 
they conclude, the missing terms should be supplied in the manner 
most favorable to Krantz so long as Krantz can support his claim 
with credible expert testimony.74 
 With all respect, if this is the lesson we are to draw from the case, 
then I am going to flunk this course, and so, I am afraid, are a pleth-
ora of parties and judges. Here is the rub: Krantz “invested” a re-
source that he already owned.75 He developed that resource—his 
know-how—because of his relationship with Kaiser, not because of 
his relationship with BT.76 That know-how may very well have been 
of value to BT, but it was not developed for and because of the con-
tract with BT.77 
                                                                                                                      
 70. Id. at 741-42. 
 71. Id. at 741. 
 72. Id. at 741-42. If that is sufficient notice, it is unclear to me how BT could possibly 
have related it to the missing terms in the alleged contract. Further, if this is an RSI, then 
what of BT’s investment in the components to be used? I presume BT’s edge over its com-
petitors in this high-tech industry required ongoing investments in physical and human 
capital. Krantz knew BT’s products were not fungible; he preferred BT components for 
some purposes, although he used other components as well. Krantz, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 
212. Did Krantz, therefore, have notice that BT was making a relationship-specific invest-
ment too?  
 73. Baker & Krawiec, supra note 2, at 741-42. This assumes, of course, that BT could 
have understood this as a communication of an intent to make a specialized investment in 
the first place—which in turn requires an intelligible definition of investment.  
 74. Id. at 742, 744 n.63. 
 75. I am assuming, for the moment, that he “owned”—had a property right in—the 
know-how. As noted earlier, supra note 43, his subcontractor might also claim ownership, 
and, of course, Kaiser was free to disclose information about its needs to other suppliers, 
including BT.  
 76. See Krantz, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 212. Indeed, according to Krantz, BT asked him 
to be an authorized reseller because of that preexisting relationship. Brief for Respondent, 
supra note 38, at 5-6.  
 77. Baker and Krawiec observe that BT did not object to Krantz’s “notice” that he was 
making an RSI, see Baker & Krawiec, supra note 2, at 741-42, but if the purpose of an ob-
jection is to prevent overinvestment, it was far too late for that. Krantz’s investment in 
know-how was by that time a sunk cost.  
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 To see why that makes a difference, let us go back to Klein, Craw-
ford and Alchian’s classic example of the printing press.78 A contracts 
to manufacture and operate a customized press for B. Once the press 
is manufactured and installed, both A and B have holdup power over 
each other because they are mutually dependent.  
 Now suppose that B is struck by lightning, goes bankrupt, or oth-
erwise disappears from the scene. B no longer has holdup power over 
A, although that does not mean that A is a happy camper. A is now 
stuck with the press and has to decide what to do with it. A might 
enter into a contract to sell or lease it to C, who might be another 
publisher or, for that matter, a scrap dealer. A is committing a re-
source—the press—to the contract with C, and A hopes to profit from 
that commitment. Thus, A is, in some sense, investing in the con-
tract. But A is not, repeat not, making a specialized investment with 
respect to the contract with C.79 A is simply selling an existing asset 
to the highest bidder.  
 I hope that by now it is obvious that if Krantz is A, the owner of 
the asset in our hypothetical, then Kaiser, not BT, is B, the party for 
whom the asset was custom-manufactured. Krantz “invested” in 
learning about Kaiser’s specialized needs in order to do business with 
Kaiser. If Kaiser decided to use someone else for its videoconferenc-
ing systems—which Kaiser was free to do, since it did not have a 
long-term contract with Krantz—then Krantz would lose the value of 
that investment. Kaiser therefore had some holdup power in the re-
lationship.80 
 But Krantz’s beef is not with Kaiser, it is with BT. So, if Kaiser is B 
in the hypothetical, who is BT? The answer is that BT is C, the 
party—think second publisher or scrap dealer—to whom Krantz tried 
to sell his preexisting asset. The Cs of the world may behave badly, but 
their power to do so is not a result of specialized investment. 
 What gave BT the power to (allegedly) behave badly in the con-
tracting process was the nature of Krantz’s asset. Know-how is a form 
of human capital. Some of it is acquired by doing and is, therefore, not 
                                                                                                                      
 78. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text. 
 79. If C is another publisher to whom A decides to lease the press, and C requires 
some custom modifications to meet C’s needs, then the cost of the modifications would be a 
specialized investment. However, C would not have holdup power—or at least not more 
holdup power than any contracting party has—as to the original investment made because 
of A’s relationship with B. Those costs are sunk.  
 80. Krantz’s investment in learning about those needs might serve as a barrier to en-
try by another competitor, giving him an advantage which would make it less easy for Kai-
ser to switch to someone else. Thus, if Kaiser had some holdup power over him, he could 
have had some over Kaiser. Kaiser, however, was perfectly willing to open up its pilot pro-
ject to competitive bids. Krantz, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 212. This suggests that Krantz’s 
know-how was not very valuable to Kaiser, who could easily communicate its needs to an-
other provider.  
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easily transferable to a novice purchaser. Some of it takes the form of 
information that can be used by anyone. Krantz’s knowledge about 
Kaiser and his system designs fall into the latter category.  
 Valuable information is an odd kind of property; the process of 
transferring it can destroy its value to the prospective seller. Infor-
mation wants to be free—or at least the law wants information to be 
free unless its status as property is very carefully protected.81 Krantz 
gave BT his information and designs without a confidentiality 
agreement.82 If he did so before any contract had been formed, then 
he is the victim of a self-inflicted wound.83 If he did so after an en-
forceable agreement had been reached, then he is a justifiably ag-
grieved plaintiff in an ordinary contract action. Under either sce-
nario, however, he is not someone who made a specialized invest-
ment because of his relationship with BT. 
B.   Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp.84 
 This case involved a requirements contract under which Gulf Oil 
agreed to supply Eastern’s aviation fuel requirements at certain air-
ports.85 When the price of crude oil rose dramatically in the early 
1970s, the contract price was lower than the market value of the fuel.86 
According to Baker and Krawiec, Eastern responded to the price dif-
ferential by “fuel freighting”—that is, by taking on more fuel than it 
needed at Gulf-serviced airports in order to avoid paying higher prices 
at non-Gulf airports, thus manipulating its requirements.87  
                                                                                                                      
 81. I do not propose to wade further into the murky waters of intellectual property here. 
 82. Perhaps Baker and Krawiec’s real concern is that BT did not warn Krantz that he 
should protect himself with a confidentiality agreement. In that case, Krantz’s “RSI notice” 
would trigger the contractual version of a Miranda warning: You have the right not to give 
away valuable information, and if you give it away, we can use it without compensating 
you.  
 Parties to commercial contracts are not, however, usually required to explain the law 
to each other, and Baker and Krawiec do not explain why that kind of information sharing 
should be forced through a default rule. Indeed, using a default rule to correct ignorance 
about the law would seem to undercut the basic premise of the default rules literature:  
parties are rational actors who can predict legal outcomes and adjust their behavior ac-
cordingly.   
 83. At least from the perspective of contract law. Krantz also alleged that his agree-
ment with BT was joint venture, which is a species of partnership. Krantz, 107 Cal. Rptr. 
2d at 212. Partnership law can yield a different result, depending on whether the jurisdic-
tion operates under the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) or the Revised Uniform Partner-
ship Act (RUPA). Under the UPA, fiduciary duties—including the duty not to appropriate 
information—exist during the negotiation period preceding the formation of a partnership, 
UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 21 (1914); under RUPA, fiduciary duties do not commence until the 
partnership is formed. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404 (1997). At the time in question, 
California was a UPA state.  
 84. 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975).  
 85. Id. at 434-35. 
 86. See id. at 433. 
 87. Baker & Krawiec, supra note 2, at 745-46. 
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 Gulf tried to renegotiate the contract price for its fuel, but Eastern 
refused.88 According to Baker and Krawiec, Gulf was locked in to its 
relationship with Eastern because it had built a new refinery and 
needed to continue to trade with Eastern; it had no readily available 
alternative customer.89 The new refinery was, or may have been, a re-
lationship-specific investment and—had the RSI default existed at 
the time of the case—a court would have used it to rule that East-
ern’s conduct was not in good faith.90 Knowing that Gulf would win if 
it came to litigation, the airline would have renegotiated the price.91  
 There are two problems with this account of the case. The first is 
that it does not comport with the facts. Gulf did not build the refinery 
so that it could supply Eastern,92 and Eastern did not dramatically in-
crease its requirements to take advantage of the price differential.93  
 The second problem is that the refinery investment did not create 
quasi-rents that could be appropriated by Eastern. Aviation fuel is 
not a customized product; Gulf’s fuel was fungible with that produced 
by other suppliers. If it were not, Eastern could not have fuel 
freighted. Further, refineries are not usually limited to one type of 
fuel. Gulf wanted out of its contract with Eastern precisely because it 
could get a higher price for its refinery products elsewhere.94 In short, 
the Eastern-Gulf contract involved a standardized product with a 
readily available market alternative. Eastern could not hold up Gulf, 
                                                                                                                      
 88. Eastern Air Lines, 415 F. Supp. at 431-32. 
 89. Baker & Krawiec, supra note 2, at 746. 
 90. Id.   
 91. Id. 
 92. Baker and Krawiec state that it is not clear from the facts of the case whether the 
refinery was  built specifically to fit the needs of Eastern. Id. I agree that the opinion is 
muddled at best. However, as Victor Goldberg has noted, the court’s reference to the refin-
ery as the reason for the contract “cannot be right. The claim that requirements contracts 
were widely used by other refineries and were used by Gulf at other refineries and at ear-
lier times is inconsistent with this explanation.” Victor P. Goldberg, Discretion in Long-
Term Open Quantity Contracts: Reining in Good Faith, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 319, 334 
(2002). Indeed, Gulf would have been crazy to build a refinery just for Eastern. Eastern 
bought only ten percent of its total fuel requirements from Gulf, id. at 333, and the refin-
ery came online when the most recent contract between them had only one year to go. See 
Eastern Air Lines, 415 F. Supp. at 432. 
 93. Id. at 335 (“[T]he variation in quantity appears to have been rather modest.”). 
This is not surprising; Eastern could not suddenly change its routes or its schedule. It was 
in business to be an airline, not a fuel jobber.   
 Gulf’s real problem was that the escalator clause in the contract, which provided a 
variable price depending on the price of crude, did not anticipate that the government 
would impose a new form of price control and that the published price would not reflect the 
“real” price of crude. See Eastern Air Lines, 415 F. Supp. at 439-40. Gulf wanted the escala-
tor clause rewritten to correct the disconnect between the published price and reality. See 
id. at 431-32, 439-40. The court was unsympathetic; it held that the language was not am-
biguous, noting that it was Gulf’s form contract and Gulf had chosen the pricing measure. 
See id. at 432, 439. 
 94. See Eastern Air Lines, 415 F. Supp. at 441 (noting Gulf Oil’s “rational desire to 
maximize its profits”). 
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and there is no reason to apply a default rule that would change the 
outcome of the case.95  
 Although Gulf’s refinery did not involve a specialized investment, 
there are other contracts that do. For example, how would the RSI 
default work in commercial leases? Baker and Krawiec do not at-
tempt to answer this question. Nevertheless, commercial leases pre-
sent the claimed virtues (and potential vices) of the RSI default in a 
useful real-world context and are therefore worth exploring.   
 Commercial leases come in a variety of flavors, ranging from 
“build to suit” to bare walls.  Their terms are intensively negotiated. 
A tenant’s relationship-specific investment in supplying the interior 
(for a bare walls lease) or a landlord’s relationship-specific invest-
ment in building to suit will presumably be reflected in those negoti-
ated terms and will take into account the fact that a customized inte-
rior may increase the value of the premises to the landlord when the 
tenant leaves—but may also decrease the value if the landlord must 
remove or rearrange the interior in order to lease to a new tenant.  
 Commercial leases, particularly in shared spaces like malls, usu-
ally assign the landlord considerable control over the tenants’ activi-
ties.  The landlord’s exercise of that control is subject to the implied 
condition of good faith, as is the landlord’s discretion to renew the 
lease, to permit subleasing, or to evict for cause.   
 How would the RSI default affect commercial landlord-tenant dis-
putes about the landlord’s exercise of control or discretion?  The an-
swer appears to be that the landlord would win in a “build to suit” 
lease, and the tenant would win in a bare walls lease—assuming, of 
course, that the counterparty had not objected to the invocation of 
the default when the lease was negotiated. 
 It is not at all clear that this result is allocationally efficient.  
Consider the bare walls tenant who intends to invest in a customized 
interior. If Baker and Krawiec are correct, the RSI default would en-
courage this investment by permitting the landlord to credibly com-
mit not to hold up the tenant while simultaneously discouraging 
                                                                                                                      
 95. Baker and Krawiec suggest that even if the refinery itself was not a specialized 
investment, other facts might have been developed to demonstrate that Gulf had made a 
specific investment in its relationship with Eastern. For example, they say, Gulf might 
have trained its workforce to work on Eastern jets or located fueling stations at Eastern 
hubs. Baker & Krawiec, supra note 2, at 747. However, unless Eastern was operating non-
standard jets, or no other airlines were using the hub airports, any such investments 
would not have specialized.  
 Indeed, if either party in this relationship was vulnerable, it was Eastern. The opinion 
does not say whether other sources of aviation fuel were available at those particular air-
ports. That does not, however, require the invention of a default rule to protect Eastern. It 
could have (and indeed may have) entered into standby contracts with alternative suppliers.
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overinvestment by giving the landlord an incentive to monitor the 
level of the tenant’s expenditure.  
 The landlord, however, is not in a particularly good position to ob-
serve the appropriate level of investment for any given tenant. If the 
landlord were an expert in running the various businesses on the 
leased premises, it would operate them itself.96  
 Further, if customized interiors produce an appropriable quasi-
rent, that may be exactly why the parties chose the sort of lease that 
required them. A tenant’s specialized investment may be a bonding 
expenditure designed to permit the tenant to credibly commit not to 
hold up the landlord. 
 Commercial leases, at least when the premises are shared with 
other tenants, produce a “double moral hazard” problem. While the 
possibility of a landlord holdup should theoretically lower the rent, 
the landlord’s ability to control the tenants and the tenant mix can 
actually increase rents. All tenants benefit when the landlord main-
tains the overall quality of a mall or any other shared commercial 
premises. That benefit can be captured in the form of higher rents 
than would otherwise obtain in a low-quality environment. Whether 
assigning discretion to the landlord actually lowers rents depends in 
part on the market’s assessment of the relative likelihood of bad 
landlord behavior versus bad tenant behavior. 
 One bad tenant can reduce the communal value of high-quality 
premises. A tenant who is leaving has no continuing interest in mall 
quality. If, for example, the lease were freely assignable, a departing 
tenant would have an incentive to hold up the landlord (or the other 
tenants) by threatening to sublease to a low-quality tenant. That 
threat is (or at least may be) more likely than a landlord’s threat to 
hold up a departing tenant by refusing consent to sublease to a high-
quality tenant. The landlord is a repeat player whose investments in 
reputation and sustained profitability make it less likely that the 
consent provision will be used solely to hold up one tenant than that 
a departing tenant will use free transferability to hold up the landlord. 
 Thus, assigning discretion to the landlord can increase the value 
of commercial leases generally. Specialized investment by tenants 
can also increase the value of commercial leases because it reduces 
any given tenant’s incentives to hold up the landlord. 
 The problem with the RSI default in this situation is that it fails 
to recognize that the very existence of the rule reduces the tenant’s 
ability to use specialized investment as a commitment device. Fur-
                                                                                                                      
 96. The same dynamic is at work in franchise arrangements. If the franchisor could 
operate the component businesses itself, it would not franchise.  Much of my analysis here 
of the role of specialized investment in commercial leases builds on Klick, Kobayashi, and  
Ribstein’s work on opportunism in franchising agreements. See Klick et al., supra note 13.  
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ther, since the default would favor the landlord in a “build to suit” 
lease, it would reduce the value of the landlord’s investment in repu-
tation as a bonding expenditure if there are other tenants who would 
later pay a higher rent for that particular configuration.97 
 I suspect that the net result of the RSI default for commercial 
leases would be that landlords and tenants would routinely waive its 
dubious protections in order to preserve their own carefully crafted 
balancing of the costs and benefits of specialized investment.  In any 
event, I wish Baker and Krawiec had focused their considerable tal-
ents on “good faith” in contracts that actually involve such invest-
ments rather than on implausible hypotheticals—which leads me to 
their next example. 
C.   A Hypothetical Requirements Contract 
 Baker and Krawiec posit a requirements contract with no speci-
fied quantity range.98 After the contract is signed, the seller makes “a 
substantial investment in targeting its production to the buyer’s 
needs,” and the buyer does not object.99 Later, in an attempt to lower 
the price, the buyer claims that it requires very little of the prod-
uct.100 The seller’s investment triggers the RSI default rule, although 
perhaps merely in order to flip the burden of proof on the buyer’s 
good faith.101 
 It is not clear whether this “targeted” production means that the 
resulting product is so specialized that no one else will buy it. If the 
product is not customized, there is no appropriable quasi-rent. Fur-
ther, the hypothetical does not explain why the buyer can so easily 
make a credible threat to do without it, given that the reciprocal of 
the seller’s specialized investment is the buyer’s specialized need.  
The holdup power would be mutual and the buyer would be vulner-
able too—yet the RSI default would increase the seller’s re-
bargaining power at the expense of the buyer. 
 Baker and Krawiec do not have a supporting case for their hypo-
thetical, which is not surprising. Requirements contracts with a 
missing quantity term are a null set. In any event, if the hypothetical 
seller did not protect itself with a “take or pay” clause, payment in 
advance, or any of a number of other available contractual devices, 
then we have another case of a party whose managers are either 
crazy or closely related to potted plants—and businesses run by such 
                                                                                                                      
 97. In such a situation, of course, the landlord’s specialized investment would not cre-
ate an appropriable quasi-rent. 
 98. Baker & Krawiec, supra note 2, at 747-48. 
 99. Id. at 748. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 749. 
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people are unlikely to have the wherewithal to make substantial in-
vestments in targeted production.  
D.   Raffles v. Wichelhaus102 
 Baker and Krawiec’s final example of a relationship specific in-
vestment is based on the classic case of the good ships Peerless.103 A 
buyer and seller contracted for the sale of cotton to be transported on 
a ship named “Peerless.”104 As it happened, two ships of the same 
name plied the Bombay to London route, one arriving in October, the 
other in December.105 The seller shipped on the December Peerless, 
and the buyer refused to accept delivery because it was not the Octo-
ber Peerless.106 The court held that the mistake as to the ship name 
meant there was no contract.107 
 Baker and Krawiec suggest that a modern court should ask 
whether either party has made a relationship-specific investment in 
the cotton contract and given the necessary notice.108 If one has, then 
that party’s interpretation of Peerless should win.109 
 I have no idea what form of relationship-specific investment the 
authors have in mind, but unless it results in customized cotton with 
no readily available alternative market, there is no quasi-rent to ap-
propriate. I have a very hard time imagining modern parties who are 
capable of bioengineering cotton and using it in a way valuable to no 
one else, but are nevertheless incapable of particularizing the ship-
ping method, using a tracking number (or a global positioning 
transmitter on the container), or electronically communicating a 
shipping confirmation. I suspect that, once again, such parties do not 
exist. 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
 Without an intelligible definition of a relationship-specific invest-
ment, I cannot tell whether the RSI default would solve or even amelio-
rate the holdup problem created by appropriable quasi-rents. Even with 
an intelligible definition, the fact that the default operates only on be-
half of the party making the investment would be deeply troubling, 
since it ignores the bilateral dependency created by the relationship.  
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 I am also generally skeptical about the apparent assumption in 
much of the default rules literature that courts can do a better job of 
protecting the economic interests of the parties than the parties 
themselves can.110 I am therefore dubious about the claimed benefits 
of the RSI default. I can, however, briefly sketch some of its more ob-
vious costs.  
 First, I can foresee a cottage industry in litigating whether a 
claimed RSI is really relationship specific and whether the notice was 
in any event sufficient.111 The costs of enforcement are real costs and 
ought not to be lightly increased. The costs of legal error are real costs 
too, and—at the risk of impermissible academic hubris—I do wonder 
how an overburdened state court judge is supposed to distinguish be-
tween relationship-specific investments that create holdup power, re-
lationship-specific investments that do not create holdup power, ordi-
nary reliance expenditures, and the mere commitment of resources—
when some very talented law professors and economists cannot.112 
 Second, if an RSI notice given during the negotiation period is 
enough to convert a not-yet-contract into a contract, it may deter a 
valuable negotiating technique, the agreement to agree.113 That, in 
turn, would result in less, not more, efficient contracting.  
 Third, the RSI default may reduce the utility of specialized invest-
ment as a bonding mechanism, particularly in situations of double 
moral hazard like franchising and commercial shopping center leases.  
 Finally, if the RSI default applies to the acquisition and dissemi-
nation of information, it permits the party possessing the informa-
tion to evade the generally understood mechanisms for protecting in-
tellectual property. Confidentiality agreements, to which both sides 
must agree, will be augmented and perhaps replaced by a unilateral 
claim of specialized investment. It is possible that those who special-
ize in intellectual property law would consider this a good thing, but 
I doubt it. 
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 In short, there is a very real question whether the RSI default, in-
telligibly defined, would reduce the costs of contracting within the 
sphere in which it will operate without producing other, even higher 
costs. At best, the answer must be a definite “maybe” and at worst, a 
resonant “no.” 
